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Hans Maes
ART OR PORN: 
CLEAR DIVISION OR FALSE DILEMMA? 
I
Jerrold Levinson conveniently summarizes the main argument of his essay “Erotic Art and Pornographic Pictures” in the following way: 
(1) Erotic art consists of images centrally aimed at a certain sort of 
reception R1.
(2) Pornography consists of images centrally aimed at a certain sort 
of reception R2.
(3) R1 essentially involves attention to form/vehicle/medium/ 
manner, and so entails treating images as in part opaque.
(4) R2 essentially excludes attention to form/vehicle/medium/ 
manner, and so entails treating images as wholly transparent.
(5) R1 and R2 are incompatible. 
(6) Hence, nothing can be both erotic art and pornography; or at 
the least, nothing can be coherently projected as both erotic art 
and pornography.1
I have argued elsewhere that premises (1) to (5) are problematic, not 
least in light of Levinson’s own views on the definition of art and the 
nature of depiction.2 I now want to focus on the final step of the argu-
ment. It is evident that (6) only follows from (1) to (5) if it is assumed 
that one cannot coherently and successfully aim at two incompatible 
audience responses. Yet, it seems to me that this assumption is false. 
One can (coherently and successfully) aim at incompatible audience 
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responses, as long as one does not expect these responses to be elicited 
at the same time, in the same audience, by the same part of the work. 
Accordingly, it appears not impossible or incoherent at all to create 
something that qualifies as both art and pornography. 
Whether we consider works of art, works of pornography, or cases in 
the disputed middle ground, what Levinson seems to have overlooked 
is that most of the representations involved are intended for multiple 
occasions of reception. They have various different parts (chapters, 
scenes, etc.) or various intended audiences or deliberately invite the 
kind of response that can evolve over time. Thus, while the same person 
cannot at the same time treat the same part of a picture or novel as both 
opaque and transparent, one can attempt (and succeed) to create work 
that is treated (A) as transparent in a first phase and as opaque in a later 
phase; or (B) as transparent by one part of the audience and as opaque 
by another part of the audience; or (C) in some parts as transparent, 
in other parts as opaque. To illustrate and further elaborate these three 
possible scenarios I will present some non-pornographic examples (for 
pornographic examples, see section III). 
(A) It sometimes happens that people first treat images as transpar-
ent and only afterwards attend to matters of form/vehicle/medium/
manner—a process that can be anticipated and planned by the artist. 
The Maltese Falcon ( John Huston, 1941) or The Bourne Ultimatum (Paul 
Greengrass, 2007) may serve as a case in point. In his review of The Bourne 
Ultimatum the film critic Roger Ebert observes that there are two kinds 
of long takes: “(1) the kind you’re supposed to notice, as in Scorsese’s 
GoodFellas, when the mobster enters the restaurant, and (2) the kind 
you don’t notice, because the action makes them invisible. Both have 
their purpose: Scorsese wanted to show how the world unfolded before 
his hero, and Greengrass wants to show the action without interrup-
tion to reinforce the illusion it is all actually happening.”3 Ebert makes 
a similar remark about the famous 7 minute long shot in The Maltese 
Falcon: “Was the shot just a stunt? Not at all; most viewers don’t notice 
it, because they’re swept along by its flow.”4 Huston’s and Greengrass’s 
virtuoso shots belong to the “kind you don’t notice” and are not sup-
posed to notice, as both directors want to throw the audience right 
into the action. Levinson writes of pornographic pictures that “they 
should present the object of sexual fantasy vividly, and then, as it were, 
get out of the way” (p. 233). In a sense, this is exactly what Huston and 
Greengrass are aiming for: to present the unfolding events as vividly as 
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possible and then, as it were, get out of the way. In other words, they 
want the audience to treat the images as transparent. Of course, when 
seeing the films for a second time, or studying the scenes frame-by-
frame, one’s attention will be drawn to the remarkable formal features 
and stylistic achievements. There is little doubt that the makers would 
welcome such detailed film analysis. Like most artists, they want their 
artistry to be acknowledged and appreciated. As such, these films invite 
the audience to respond in radically different ways at different times 
(ignoring and then later attending to formal features). 
Why, one could ask, would the same not be possible for pornography? 
Huston and Greengrass do not want to draw attention to their own 
virtuosity, at least not immediately, and instead want the audience to be 
fully immersed in the story. Making this degree of immersion possible 
typically requires great artistic skill—skill that will invite admiration when 
successfully applied. In much the same way, I think, one can imagine 
a pornographic film that, through excellent acting, a truly gripping 
story, effective use of lighting and sound, succeeds in presenting the 
objects of sexual fantasy more vividly than ever, being sexually arousing 
in the first place and inviting the viewer afterwards to contemplate the 
relationship between the arousal achieved and the means employed to 
achieve it. Even within the narrow parameters set by Levinson, such a 
film would qualify as pornographic art.
(B) It can be the aim of the artist that one part of the audience treats 
the images as transparent while another part of the audience treats them 
as opaque. Again, films offer good examples. Take Quentin Tarantino’s 
Kill Bill or Death Proof. An argument could be made that these films 
are pastiches of certain popular genres. On the one hand, they possess 
many obvious genre markers of kung fu films, slasher films and car 
chase movies, but on the other hand, they also challenge and stretch the 
conventions of those genres, exaggerating certain aspects and employ-
ing typical narrative or stylistic devices in an extremely self-conscious 
way. As such they seem to appeal to both the usual consumers of those 
genre films and to film critics and film buffs. The latter are drawn to 
Tarantino’s films for cinematic reasons, paying close attention to the 
many subtle references, original dialogues and virtuoso camerawork, 
usually absent from the typical instances of these genre films. Teenag-
ers, by contrast, unaware of or uninterested in these stylistic aspects, 
treat his pictures as more or less transparent. They are absorbed by the 
story and the action or violence depicted, quite oblivious to Tarantino’s 
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sophisticated recuperation of film history. Thus, films like Kill Bill and 
Death Proof are perfectly geared towards audiences that ignore matters 
of form/vehicle/medium/manner and audiences that precisely focus 
on those features. 
If this is possible for the slasher and kung fu genre, then why not 
for pornography? In fact, Quentin Tarantino has stated in interviews 
that he would once like to direct a porn movie. If he ever decides to go 
through with this, and if the result is as “Tarantinesque” as the rest of 
his oeuvre, we have every reason to suspect that the film will be received 
in radically different ways by different audiences, and will be regarded 
as film art and pornography at the same time.
(C) An artist can intend one part of her work to be treated as trans-
parent, while another part of the work is treated as opaque. This is the 
most straightforward of the three scenarios. Even if we were to subscribe 
to Levinson’s idea that aesthetic experience (R1) and sexual arousal 
(R2) are mutually exclusive, one could still imagine an author writing 
a novel with great literary merit, wishing to give her readers aesthetic 
delight, but also adding one or two sexually explicit and arousing 
chapters for purely commercial reasons; or a filmmaker who, hoping 
to create a financially profitable controversy, adds a few pornographic 
scenes to an arthouse film (this is what Bob Guccione did in the final 
editing stage of Caligula, making it the highest grossing Penthouse film 
of all time). Examples of this sort illustrate in yet another way how it 
is not in the least impossible to aim at two radically different or even 
conflicting audience responses.
Of course, diverging aims as the ones I have just described, may result 
in work that lacks coherence. But this need not be the case. Moreover, 
even if the resulting work is less than coherent, that would only imply 
that it is not as good a work of art as it could have been (there are 
many great works of art that are somewhat flawed because of conflict-
ing ambitions within the work). This one deficiency in itself would not 
justify excluding the work from the realm of art altogether. Yet, that 
is exactly what Levinson wishes to establish. He does not just say that 
pornographers produce bad art. Rather, he claims that what pornogra-
phers produce has nothing to do with art, that everything they create 
falls outside of the realm of art. I have tried to show that this claim is 
fundamentally unwarranted and untenable. 
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II
I turn now to Christy Mag Uidhir’s essay “Why Pornography Can’t 
Be Art.” Like Levinson, he has chosen a title that leaves no doubt as 
to where he stands on the issue at hand and with a similar degree of 
clarity and organization he lays out his argument: 
(1) If something is pornography, then that something has the purpose 
of sexual arousal (of some audience).
(2) If something is pornography, then that something has the purpose 
of sexual arousal and that purpose is manner inspecific.
(3) If something is art, then if that something has a purpose, then 
that purpose is manner specific.
(4) If something is art, then if that something has the purpose of 
sexual arousal, then that purpose is manner specific.
(5) A purpose cannot be both manner specific and manner 
inspecific.
(6) Therefore, if something is pornography, then it is not art.5
For Mag Uidhir, a purpose is manner specific if it is essentially consti-
tuted both by an action (or state of affairs) and a manner, such that the 
purpose is to perform that action (or bring about that state of affairs) 
in that particular manner. For a purpose to be manner inspecific, by 
contrast, is simply for it not to be manner specific. In other words, if a 
purpose is manner inspecific, then failure to bring about the state of 
affairs in the prescribed manner does not constitute failure to satisfy 
the purpose.
Mag Uidhir’s account has a number of distinct advantages. To begin 
with, it is entirely value neutral in the sense that it does not appeal 
to some essential moral or aesthetic value difference to draw the line 
between the realm of art and the realm of pornography. Furthermore, 
his account is not based on any robust theories of art or pornography. 
Mag Uidhir only invokes a limited set of necessary conditions. Given 
how difficult it has proven in the past to define either what art or what 
pornography is, this certainly seems a commendable strategy. While 
Levinson’s argument is bogged down by the controversial claim that 
a work of art’s main purpose is to create an aesthetic experience and 
draw attention to its own formal features, Mag Uidhir’s argument does 
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not rely on any such substantial claim. Still, regarding the central issue, 
he aligns himself squarely with Levinson. He, too, thinks that artists or 
pornographers attempting to produce something that is both art and 
pornography, in fact attempt the impossible. I hope to show, however, 
that his argument ultimately fails in the same way that the argument in 
“Erotic Art and Pornographic Pictures” fails. The conclusion that Mag 
Uidhir reaches, I believe, does not at all follow from the premises he 
proposes. 
Mag Uidhir wants to demonstrate that art and pornography are radi-
cally separate categories by showing that the success conditions for both 
categories are fundamentally different. Premise (4) specifies that, for 
something to count as a sexually arousing work of art, i.e., a work of art 
that fulfils its purpose of bringing about sexual arousal, it needs to bring 
about sexual arousal in the prescribed way. Premise (2), by contrast, states 
that for something to count as a successful work of pornography, i.e., 
a work of pornography that fulfils its purpose, it needs to bring about 
sexual arousal, period. In Mag Uidhir’s own words, the “sexual arousal 
of the audience simpliciter matters. . . . This is precisely what it means to 
be manner inspecific” (p. 197). If, for argument’s sake, we accept these 
premises to be true (which, to my mind, is not obviously the case6), then 
we have established that there is an important difference between the 
category of art and the category of pornography. What has not been 
shown, however, is that both categories are mutually exclusive. 
In order to show that something cannot legitimately fall under both 
categories, it is simply not enough to argue that their respective success 
conditions are different. One needs to show that it is impossible for a 
particular object to fulfil both success conditions. And Mag Uidhir’s 
argument does not do that. Not only is it perfectly possible for a par-
ticular work to satisfy both success conditions, but satisfying the success 
conditions for sexually arousing art even seems to entail satisfying the 
stated success conditions for pornography. For suppose that a novel, a 
photograph or a film brings about sexual arousal in the prescribed way 
(and we can take this to mean whatever Mag Uidhir wants it to mean). 
Then it will have fulfilled the success condition for sexually arousing art 
(“for something to count as a sexually arousing work of art, it needs to 
brings about sexual arousal in the prescribed way”) as well as the success 
condition for pornography (“for something to count as a successful work 
of pornography it needs to bring about sexual arousal, period”). 
Note that the latter thought does not imply that each sexually arous-
ing work of art is automatically a work of pornography since Mag Uidhir 
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only refers to necessary, not sufficient, conditions for something’s being 
pornography or (sexually arousing) art. However, it does cut away the 
ground under the idea of a sharp division between pornography and 
art, with no chance of overlap. Contrary to Mag Uidhir’s confident 
conclusion, we have no a priori reason to assume that if something is 
pornography it cannot be art. 
In a sense, this outcome is not just reassuring for the advocates of 
pornographic art. If Mag Uidhir’s argument had been successful it would 
have been very easy to construct similar arguments showing how noth-
ing can be both a piece of furniture and a work of art, or a religious 
mask and a work of art, or journalism and art, etc. Here is one example 
of how this would work. (All remaining doubts about the invalidity of 
the argument will surely disappear if one keeps Cellini’s magnificent 
Saliera in mind.) 
(1) If something is a salt cellar, then that something has the purpose 
of holding and dispensing salt.
(2) If something is a salt cellar, then that something has the pur-
pose of holding and dispensing salt and that purpose is manner 
inspecific.
(3) If something is art, then if that something has a purpose, then 
that purpose is manner specific.
(4) If something is art, then if that something has the purpose of hold-
ing and dispensing salt, then that purpose is manner specific.
(5) A purpose cannot be both manner specific and manner 
inspecific.
(6) Therefore, if something is a salt cellar, then it is not art.
This argument fails for the exact same reason that the pornography 
argument fails. The fact that Mag Uidhir’s approach, applied consistently, 
would force us to exclude much uncontentious art from the realm of 
art (the decorated urns of ancient Greece, nineteenth-century dance 
music, didactic novels, religious icons) I consider it to be just another 
nail in the coffin for his view.
III
Pornographic art is not the oxymoron that Levinson and Mag Uidhir 
assume it to be. Of course, there may be other arguments against the 
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possibility of pornographic art that I haven’t considered yet. But I am 
confident that these, too, will prove to be invalid or unsound when 
examined closely. Here is why: I am sure that there can be works of 
 pornographic art, simply because there already are works of pornographic 
art. Let me list a few examples taken from different art forms. 
In the domain of literature one could mention, besides the inevitable 
Marquis de Sade, Pierre Louÿs’s Trois Filles de Leur Mère (She-Devils), 
Pauline Réage’s Histoire d’O (The Story of O), and Mieke Maaike’s Obscene 
Jeugd (The Obscene Youth of Mieke Maaike), written by one of Flanders’ 
most celebrated authors, Louis Paul Boon. In the visual arts there is 
the rich tradition of Japanese shunga illustrations: woodblock prints 
depicting sexually explicit scenes intended for use in brothels and the 
private bedroom. Exquisite examples include Hishikawa Morohira’s 
“Erotic scenes” (c. 1700), Isoda Koryusai’s “Man kissing woman’s nipple” 
(late eighteenth century), Kitagawa Utamaro’s “Woman with man with 
black cloth and food service” (1788) and Katsushika Hokusai’s famous 
depiction of an Awabi fisherwoman being “embraced” by an octopus 
(“Untitled” 1824). Indian culture gave us the Kama Sutra and many 
highly artistic miniatures depicting sexual positions directly or indirectly 
inspired by the Kama Sutra. “The private pleasure of Prince Murad son of 
Shah Jahah by Goverdhan” or “The private pleasure of Raja Dalpat Singh 
by Lakroo” (1678–98) are just two examples. In the Western tradition 
there are a number of canonized artists who have produced paintings, 
drawings, engravings of an unmistakable pornographic nature (though 
for censorship reasons these were rarely displayed in public and often 
deliberately kept secret). Images such as “Reclining Masturbating Girl” 
by Klimt (1916–17), “Woman with Black Stockings” (1913) by Schiele, 
“Female Nude on All Fours, Rear View, Dress Lifted to Hips” by Rodin 
(undated), or “I Modi” created by the engraver Marcantonio Raimondi 
after a series of paintings by Giulio Romano (16th century), are as 
explicit and arousing as any image in Hustler Magazine, though their 
artistic quality is infinitely greater. When arguing for the existence of 
pornographic art photography the obvious name to mention is Robert 
Mapplethorpe, while In the Realm of the Senses (Nagisa Ôshima, 1976), 
with its many subtle references to the shunga tradition, is often cited 
as the best example of a pornographic art film. Finally, there is the 
artform of the graphic novel, often overlooked in discussions about 
pornographic art. There are numerous pornographic comic books that, 
in my opinion, deserve the status of art, including (but not limited to): 
Guido Crepax’s “The Story of O” (1975) and “Justine” (1979), Alan 
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Moore and Melinda Gebbie’s “Lost Girls” (2006), and Dave McKean’s 
short story “X-Rated” (2009). This by no means exhaustive list indicates 
that the cross-section between pornography and art does not just exist 
in theory but in reality. The label “pornographic art” seems perfectly 
appropriate for each one of the examples mentioned. 
It should be said that both Levinson and Mag Uidhir have tried to 
anticipate and neutralize possible counterexamples. In fact, both have 
argued that the phrase “pornographic art” can be used in a meaningful 
way, without thereby conceding that there is an extensional overlap of 
pornography and art. Nevertheless, their respective “escape strategies” 
have considerable weaknesses and, as I will now show, prove ineffective 
against the examples I have just listed.
IV
To remove the air of paradox from the assertion that there is por-
nographic art but nothing that is both art and pornography, Levinson 
appeals to a weak and a strong sense of the term “pornographic”: “In 
the strong, or conjunctive, sense, something is pornographic art if it is 
both art and pornography; in the weak, or modifying, sense, something 
is pornographic art if it is art and has a pornographic character, look, 
or aspect” (p. 235). To clarify this distinction he draws an analogy with 
photographic art. When we call something “photographic art” this usu-
ally means that the object is both a photograph and art. But that is not 
always the case. Think of the photorealist paintings of Chuck Close or 
Richard Estes. These are often termed “photographic art” though they 
are not photographs. The term “photographic” is used here in the weak, 
modifying sense. According to Levinson, there is only pornographic art 
in the weak sense of “pornographic”: works of art that are copying the 
look of pornography or using cutouts from pornographic magazines 
or that contain allusions to pornography, without themselves actually 
being pornography.
When the popular media use the expression “pornographic art” it is 
indeed often to refer to the kind of work that Levinson has in mind. 
Chris Ofili’s “The Holy Virgin Mary” (1996), which caused quite a media 
uproar, is one example. One could also think of some of Thomas Ruff’s 
nude photographs, Jeff Koons’s statuettes, Marlene Dumas’s paintings, 
Fiona Banner’s text pieces, Paul McCarthy’s inflatables, or Ghada Amer’s 
embroidery. Such works are directly inspired by pornography and have 
been condemned (and sometimes praised) as “pornographic art,” but 
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they are not pornography. For one thing, they are not centrally aimed 
at sexual arousal and, as almost all theorists will agree, this is a necessary 
condition for something’s being pornography. So, these works lack an 
essential feature of pornography, just like one or more essential features 
of photography are missing from Estes’s and Close’s paintings.
However, while the pornographic artworks of Ofili, Dumas or Amer can 
usefully be excluded from the realm of pornography and hence do not 
qualify as both art and pornography, the same is not true of the examples 
of pornographic art that I have put forward. All the works mentioned 
in section III are centrally aimed at bringing about sexual arousal.7 So, 
these works provide counterexamples to Levinson’s account that cannot 
be set aside by appealing to a weak sense of the word “pornographic.” 
Unsurprisingly, most of them are ignored in Levinson’s text. 
Of all the works listed in section III, Levinson only mentions the 
drawings of Klimt and Schiele as potential problems for his account. 
The latter’s work in particular raises his concern as “Schiele’s manifest 
intention for many of his sexually-themed drawings was indeed porno-
graphic, since they were created expressly for male patrons with precisely 
that sort of use in mind” (p. 238). He sees two ways of dealing with this 
case (without expressing a clear preference for one solution over the 
other): “The first is simply to accept that, on the conception defended 
here, those drawings must be accounted pornography, but pornography 
that it is uncommonly aesthetically rewarding. . . . The second is to posit 
for those drawings an implicit artistic intention as robust as the explicit 
pornographic one . . . in virtue of which they can be accounted, though 
uneasily, erotic art after all” (p. 238).
Both suggested solutions are deeply unsatisfactory. The first proposal 
is to put Schiele’s sexually-themed work squarely in the category of “por-
nography” and deny it the status of “art.” While Levinson may be willing 
to bite this bullet, art critics or art historians will find this completely 
unacceptable. The second proposal is to think of the work as the product 
of two equally robust intentions: an artistic and a pornographic one. 
But that such a thing could be possible is exactly what Levinson’s whole 
argument is meant to disprove. His account is built entirely on the idea 
that the two intentions war against one another (which brings to mind 
J. L. Austin’s famous quip about the ways of philosophers: “There’s the 
bit where he says it and the bit where he takes it back”).
I think it is more than appropriate to call Schiele’s art “pornographic” 
in the strong sense of the term and I believe the same holds true for the 
other examples I mentioned in section III. Each of these works qualifies 
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as both art and pornography. I am by no means the only one who thinks 
so. Linda Williams, for instance, calls In the Realm of the Senses “the first 
example of feature-length narrative cinema anywhere in the world to 
succeed as both art and pornography.”8 Arthur Danto underlines the 
fact that Mapplethorpe “achieves images that are beautiful and excit-
ing at once: pornography and art in the same striking photographs.”9 
Douglas Wolk says of Lost Girls: “It is . . . beautiful, literary and moving. 
It’s also bluntly pornographic, with explicit sex scenes on almost every 
page.”10 After reading Pauline Réage’s The Story of O Susan Sontag was 
convinced that “works of pornography can belong to literature”11 and 
Brian Aldiss wrote: “I do believe that Pauline Réage has confounded all 
her critics and made pornography . . . an art.”12
These examples of pornographic art, I now want to argue, also under-
mine Mag Uidhir’s account. Mag Uidhir basically agrees with Levinson 
that when a picture or novel is labeled “pornographic art” this only means 
“that the artwork is like pornography, that is, displays characteristics 
typical of actualworld pornography—being sexually explicit, indecent, 
obscene, even objectifying or degrading” (Mag Uidhir, pp. 200–201). A 
pornographic work of art, he thinks, is not both a work of art and por-
nography. By contrast, a pornographic magazine is both a magazine and 
pornography. Unlike Levinson, Mag Uidhir does not appeal to a strong 
and a weak sense of the term “pornographic” to explain this distinction. 
Rather, he thinks that the word performs two different functions in the 
expressions “pornographic magazine” and “pornographic art.” The word 
is used “first to indicate what purpose the thing has or what features 
the thing was intended to have and second to indicate what (salient) 
features the thing in fact has or doesn’t have” (p. 201). 
To demonstrate that this is indeed the case, he asks us to consider 
the sentence “This pornographic art is decidedly unpornographic.” 
Such a sentence sounds awkward in the same way that the sentence 
“This romantic gesture is decidedly unromantic” sounds awkward. Both 
sentences are odd, he explains, because they tell us that their respective 
things both have and do not have certain features—which is nonsensical. 
By comparison, the sentence “This pornographic magazine is decidedly 
unpornographic” does not sound awkward at all, just like there is noth-
ing odd about saying “This romantic comedy is decidedly unromantic.” 
The latter two sentences simply tell us that while their respective things 
were intended to have certain features they do not as a matter of fact 
have those features. 
The first critical question one could ask is this: if the distinction 
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between “pornographic art” and “pornographic magazine” really runs 
parallel to the distinction between “romantic gesture” and “romantic 
comedy,” and if the word “romantic” in “romantic comedy” only indicates 
that the comedy is intended to be romantic, whereas the same word 
in the phrase “romantic gesture” indicates that the gesture is actually 
romantic, then shouldn’t we conclude that the word “pornographic” in 
“pornographic art” indicates that it is actually, genuinely pornographic 
whereas the same word in “pornographic magazine” performs no such 
function? This would be the exact opposite of the conclusion Mag 
Uidhir wants to reach. 
I admit that it would be a little too easy to dismiss the argument on 
the basis of this somewhat uncharitable reading alone. Mag Uidhir’s 
point, I take it, is that while a pornographic magazine is made explicitly 
with the purpose of being pornography, a pornographic work of art is 
not and that this makes all the difference. Pornographic works of art 
may possess various salient features of pornography but they are not 
created for pornographic use and hence do not qualify as pornography. 
However, taken as a factual statement, this is simply wrong. As I have 
indicated above, all the works listed in section III were created, at least 
partly, for pornographic purposes. Moreover, to infer from the awk-
wardness of “This pornographic art is decidedly unpornographic” that 
nothing can be both art and pornography—which, in a sense, is what 
Mag Uidhir’s argument boils down to—is highly problematic. Just think 
of the equally awkward statement “This photographic art is decidedly 
unphotographic.” Surely, one would not want to infer from this that 
nothing can be both art and photography? Relatedly, and most crucially, 
even if statements like “This pornographic art is decidedly unporno-
graphic” or “This photographic art is decidedly unphotographic” sound 
a little odd, that does not mean that one cannot think of a context in 
which such statements would make perfect sense. Consider “painterly 
photography” as practiced by some contemporary photographers. These 
photographs look so much like paintings that one would not at all be 
surprised to hear someone say “This photographic art is decidedly 
unphotographic.” Similarly, it is not that difficult to think of a context 
in which it would be appropriate to say of a pornographic work of art 
that it is “decidedly unpornographic.” For instance, several critics have 
pointed out that, in contrast to cliché instances of pornography, Lost 
Girls is not one-dimensional, unimaginative, or anti-intellectual. In that 
respect, one could say that the pornographic work of Alan Moore and 
Melinda Gebbie is decidedly unpornographic. Or take the short film 
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Skin (Elin Magnusson, 2009). Contrary to what one might expect from 
a pornographic film, Skin is not objectifying, loveless, exploitative or 
aggressive. As such, it would not be awkward to call this pornographic 
work of art “decidedly unpornographic.” In effect, it is very easy to set 
up a similar construction for all of the examples of pornographic art that 
I have put forward. That is precisely because, as works of pornography, 
they are all untypical (“unpornographic”) in the sense that they were 
created by artists who succeeded in avoiding the low aesthetic standards 
of the average pornographic product and thus, pace Mag Uidhir and 
Levinson, in creating art.
V
At present, the collection of works that qualify as both pornography 
and art only constitutes a tiny subclass of the domain of pornography. 
This is hardly surprising given, on the one hand, the vast output of the 
porn industry and, on the other hand, the various legal, political, moral, 
and economical restrictions that still make it difficult for established 
artists and filmmakers to properly engage with this material. However, 
while the cross-section of art and pornography may be small in size, I 
have tried to show that it is not non-existent. And I wish to conclude 
by expressing the hope that in the future there will be more novels, 
photographs, comic books, and movies that will confidently occupy this 
interesting middle ground. After all, as a famous film critic once put it, 
“sex is too important to be left to the sex-film industry.”13 
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